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GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 This appeal requires us to determine whether the 
federal courts must entertain a constitutional challenge to the 
City of Philadelphia's parking ticket procedures -- procedures 
that resulted in the imposition of a $45 fine against plaintiff-
appellee John O'Neill, which remains unpaid, and a $173 fine 
against plaintiff-appellee Samuel Goodman, which was paid.  We 
hold that the district court should have exercised its discretion 
to abstain, rather than to decide the constitutionality of 
Philadelphia's ticketing procedures.  Thus, we will vacate the 
district court's judgment and remand with instructions that the 
district court dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. 
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I 
 John O'Neill ("O'Neill") and Samuel Goodman ("Goodman") 
brought suit in federal district court against the City of 
Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Parking Authority, the Office of 
the Director of Finance, and the Bureau of Administrative Office 
of Adjudication (collectively, the "City"), alleging that the 
City's reorganization of its system for adjudicating parking 
tickets violated their constitutional rights, and the 
constitutional rights of similarly situated plaintiffs.  On March 
29, 1993, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs on their due process claim, vacating the City's 
$45 fine against O'Neill, and entering judgment in the amount of 
$173 in favor of Goodman.  O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 817 
F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 Although the district court declined the City's 
invitation to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this 
action, id at 562 n.8, and despite the City's failure to protest 
the district court's abstention determination on appeal, we asked 
the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the question 
of whether the district court properly should have abstained from 
entertaining the plaintiffs' claims under the abstention doctrine 
announced by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971), and its progeny.0 
                                                           
0
 Even though the question of Younger abstention was not 
raised by the parties on appeal, we may consider it sua sponte. 
4 
 We conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion in refusing to abstain under Younger and in reaching 
the merits of O'Neill and Goodman's due process claim. 
 
II 
A. 
 Prior to June 1, 1989, the "Traffic Court of 
Philadelphia" had original jurisdiction to adjudicate parking 
violations committed in the City of Philadelphia.  42 Pa. Cons. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143-44 n.10 (1976); McLaughlin 
v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 314 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989); Blake v. 
Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 727 (3d Cir. 1979).  Cf. Winston v. Children 
and Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1384-85 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(declining to address question of abstention where defendants 
failed to preserve the issue for appellate review).  But see id. 
at 1396-98 (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing cases holding that 
failure to file a cross appeal did not preclude Court of Appeals' 
consideration of particular issues). 
 In addition, we note somewhat surprisingly that we are 
not the first federal Court of Appeals to focus on the Younger 
problems that arise when parking tickets are challenged in § 1983 
actions.  In a case similar to the one before us on appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit decided that Younger abstention was appropriate 
where the federal claimant had initiated a federal action instead 
of contesting his numerous parking violations in the available 
state forum.  Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook Mun. Corp., 824 
F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1987).  See also Horn v. City of Chicago, 860 
F.2d 700, 702 n.5 (7th Cir. 1988) (reversing district court's 
holding that parking ticket demand notices issued by the City of 
Chicago violated the plaintiffs' due process rights and seriously 
questioning district court's conclusion that Younger abstention 
was not appropriate); Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 
1988) (holding that Younger precluded consideration of claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief while state criminal 
prosecutions were pending against Ballard on his thirty-six 
violations of the City of Houston's overtime parking ordinance); 
Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107 (2d Cir. 1977) (recognizing, but 
refusing to decide, Younger issue in action challenging City of 
New York's parking regulations). 
5 
Stat. Ann. §§ 1302 and 1321.  Appeals from the traffic court's 
decisions were heard by the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. 
 In 1989, the Philadelphia City Council reorganized the 
City's system for adjudicating parking tickets by enacting an 
ordinance which authorized the Office of the Director of Finance 
to assume control over the regulation and disposition of parking 
violations in the City of Philadelphia.  12 Phila. City Code 
§ 12-2802(1).  Under the new framework, a parking ticket is 
affixed to the vehicle, id. § 12-2804(3), and the owner of the 
ticketed vehicle is sent a notice by first class mail.  Id. § 12-
2805(1).  The person to whom the ticket is issued has fifteen 
days to answer it, either admitting the violation by payment of 
the fines, costs, and fees, admitting with explanation, or 
denying liability and requesting a hearing.  Id. § 12-2806(1).  A 
failure to answer or to pay the fine will result in a Bureau of 
Administrative Adjudication ("BAA")0 hearing examiner's entering 
an order by default sustaining the charges, fixing the 
appropriate fine, and assessing appropriate costs and fees.  Id. 
§ 12-2807(3). 
 When the violation is contested, and a hearing is 
requested, a BAA hearing examiner holds a hearing and determines 
whether the charges have been established.  Id. § 12-2807.  Once 
the hearing examiner has entered his decision, the violator has 
                                                           
0
 Regulations adopted by the Director of Finance created 
the Bureau of Administrative Adjudication for the purpose of 
exercising the duties and powers enumerated in chapter 12-2800 of 
the Philadelphia City Code, the chapter added by the 1989 
ordinance. 
6 
thirty days to file an appeal to the BAA Parking Appeals Panel. 
Id. § 12-2808.  The BAA's decision, or a default by the ticket 
holder, creates a debt owed to the City.  Id. § 12-2808(5).  The 
decision of the Parking Appeals Panel can be appealed to the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, and through the state 
judicial system.  2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 752.0 
 The effect of the 1989 reorganization was to change the 
nature of parking violations from summary offenses, which were 
criminal in nature, to civil violations.  In practice, a 
defendant before the traffic court was entitled to three rights 
not available at a BAA hearing: (1) a disposition could not be 
made without the personal appearance of the defendant, (2) the 
defendant's guilt had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
(3) the two-year statute of limitations for summary offenses was 
in effect.0 
 Finally, the new ordinance created a period of dual 
jurisdiction during which a person who had received a parking 
ticket, citation, or traffic court summons between October 2, 
                                                           
0
 Section 752 provides as follows: "Any person aggrieved 
by an adjudication of a local agency who has a direct interest in 
such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the 
court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to 
Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure)." 
0
 O'Neill and Goodman argue that they were 
unconstitutionally deprived of rights which were only available 
in traffic court.  We know of no constitutional right, however, 
to a hearing before a tribunal of one's own choosing, see Crane 
v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1928); Sill v. Pennsylvania State 
University, 462 F.2d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1972), or to assert a 
defense based upon a given statute of limitations.  See Chase 
Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945). 
7 
1987 and May 31, 1989, could choose to proceed either in traffic 
court or before the BAA.  12 Phila. City Code § 12-2807(8). 
 
B. 
 O'Neill and Goodman had received parking tickets both 
before and after the effective date of the 1989 ordinance.0 
Neither paid their fines.  Neither responded to the summons and 
periodic payment-notices which were sent to them.  In particular, 
neither answered "Violation Warning Notice[s]" sent in November 
1989 by the Office of the Director of Finance explaining that 
they could elect to appear before the traffic court or the BAA 
for the purpose of contesting their outstanding tickets.  Nor did 
they respond to "Order[s] of Default" informing them that their 
failure to pay the fines could result in the City's taking 
further legal action which might have an adverse effect on their 
property rights.0 
                                                           
0
 The plaintiffs' claims relate only to the retrospective 
application of the reorganized adjudicatory procedures to the 
parking tickets they received prior to June 1, 1989.  The tickets 
which fall into this category were issued on the following dates: 
 
Goodman    O'Neill 
May 16, 1989   May 1, 1989 
December 7, 1988  October 10, 1988 
December 11, 1987  November 28, 1987 
December 11, 1987 
February 26, 1987 
0
 While we need not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' 
constitutional claim, we note that at least one other Court of 
Appeals has held that individuals who have received, but 
purposefully ignored, timely and repeated notices alerting them 
of their right to a hearing at which they could contest parking 
violations, are in no position to argue that those notices 
deprived them of due process.  See Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 
932 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding car owner who ignored ten 
8 
 On March 4, 1991, Goodman requested a hearing before 
the BAA to contest a ticket he had received on February 4, 1991. 
The hearing examiner held such a hearing on March 18, 1991, at 
which it assumed jurisdiction over the February 4 ticket, and 
nine additional tickets for which Goodman was responsible.  Five 
of the tickets dated from before June 1, 1989.  Five dated from 
after June 1, 1989. 
 Goodman objected that the BAA lacked jurisdiction to 
determine his liability on the pre-June 1, 1989 tickets, and 
that, in any event, he had the right to raise the statute of 
limitations as a defense in the BAA proceeding.  The hearing 
examiner overruled Goodman's objections and assessed total fines 
of $173.00 for the pre-June 1, 1989 tickets, and $74.10 for the 
post-June 1, 1989 tickets.  Goodman paid his fines.0 
 In April 1991, O'Neill attempted to list for 
disposition with the traffic court three pre-June 1, 1989 parking 
tickets.  The traffic court informed him that it no longer heard 
parking violation cases.  O'Neill then requested a hearing with 
the BAA at which he raised the same objections as Goodman.  On 
August 30, 1991, the BAA hearing examiner rejected O'Neill's 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tickets, follow-up notices, and 21-day warning of eligibility for 
booting, could not insist that city violated his due process 
rights by putting "Denver Boot" on his car).  Saukstelis had been 
denied a preliminary injunction, giving rise to the appeal. 
Despite that posture of the case, the Seventh Circuit remanded 
with instructions "to enter judgment for the City without further 
ado."  Id. at 1174. 
0
 Even though Goodman has paid his fines, a possible 
refund of those fines constitutes a collateral consequence 
sufficient to prevent mootness.  Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 
53-54 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992); Nakell v. Attorney Gen., 15 F.3d 319, 
322 (4th Cir. 1994). 
9 
objections but reduced his liability for the outstanding parking 
tickets to $45.00.  O'Neill has not paid his fine. 
 On October 30, 1991, O'Neill and Goodman filed a five-
count complaint (later amended) against the City of Philadelphia, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City had violated 
their constitutional and state-law rights by denying them a 
hearing before the traffic court with respect to the parking 
tickets they had received prior to June 1, 1989.0  On October 15, 
1992, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class 
certification but agreed to consider the action as a test case 
for persons similarly situated.  The case was submitted on cross 
motions for summary judgment.0 
                                                           
0
 Count One alleged that the City had violated the 
plaintiffs' due process rights by denying them the rights which 
had been available in traffic court. 
 Count Two alleged that the City had violated the 
plaintiffs' due process rights, and the Ex Post Facto clause of 
the United States Constitution, by failing to obtain the 
plaintiffs' consent to its jurisdiction, as required by the City 
ordinance, and by applying the laws and regulations governing 
hearings under the 1989 ordinance, and not those of the traffic 
court. 
 Count Three alleged that the City exceeded the 
authority granted under Pennsylvania law by unlawfully extending 
the BAA's subject matter jurisdiction. 
 Count Four alleged that the BAA violated the U.S. and 
Pennsylvania Constitutions by holding hearings on parking 
violations that were time barred under Pennsylvania law. 
 Count Five alleged § 12-2807(4) is an unconstitutional 
Bill of Attainder to the extent it subjects the plaintiffs' 
vehicles to seizure without a hearing. 
0
 The City argues that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims.  In particular, the 
City argues that because the plaintiffs did not appeal the 
hearing examiner's determination to the Parking Appeals Panel, 
under 12 Phila. City Code § 12-2808(5), the Finance Director's 
Office had not reached a final decision as to the plaintiffs' 
liability, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs' federal suit was 
premature.  We disagree.  Section 12-2808(5) explicitly provides 
10 
 On March 29, 1993, the district court granted the 
City's motion for summary judgment as to four of the five 
constitutional claims alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint.0 With 
respect to the remaining count ("Count Two"), however, the 
district court held that the City's failure to allow the 
plaintiffs to challenge their pre-June 1, 1989 tickets in traffic 
court, as opposed to the BAA, violated the plaintiffs' due 
process rights.  Consequently, the district court entered 
judgment in favor of Goodman in the amount of $173.00, and 
directed the City to vacate its outstanding $45.00 judgment 
against O'Neill. 
 The district court also ordered the parties to submit 
memoranda as to the appropriate terms of relief, and procedure to 
be adopted by the BAA, with respect to the 2,713,975 persons 
similarly situated to O'Neill and Goodman (i.e., persons who had 
undisposed of parking violation summonses issued before June 1, 
1989).  Recognizing the potentially heavy financial burden such 
relief might place on the City's resources, the district court 
stayed this latter portion of its order pending appeal. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that "in the event that no appeal is taken [to the Parking 
Appeals Panel], the order of the Parking Hearing Examiner shall 
be the final order [of the Finance Director's Office]." 
0
 The plaintiffs-appellees have not appealed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment against them on the 
constitutional claims alleged in Counts One, Four, and Five, nor 
its grant of summary judgment with respect to the ex post facto 
allegations in Count Two.  Because the plaintiffs did not press 
for summary judgment on the state claims alleged in Counts Three 
and Four of their complaint, the district court deemed them to 
have been withdrawn without prejudice.  The district court's 
judgment is found in its entirety at O'Neill v. City of 
Philadelphia, 817 F. Supp. at 570-71 (E.D. Pa. 1993).   
11 
 We have jurisdiction over the City's appeal from the 
partial grant of summary judgment in favor of O'Neill and Goodman 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
III 
 The abstention doctrine first announced by the Supreme 
Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in the context of 
a pending state criminal prosecution, has since been extended to 
non-criminal state civil proceedings, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 
420 U.S. 592 (1975), and state administrative proceedings, 
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 
423, (1982), in which important state interests are implicated, 
so long as the federal claimant has an opportunity to raise any 
constitutional claims before the administrative agency or in 
state-court judicial review of the agency's determination.  Ohio 
Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 
629 (1986). 
 In Middlesex, the Supreme Court delineated three 
requirements which must be satisfied before a federal court may 
abstain from hearing a case over which it has jurisdiction: (1) 
there must be pending or ongoing state proceedings which are 
judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings must implicate 
important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings must 
afford an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional 
12 
issues.  457 U.S. at 432; Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 
202, 211 (3d Cir. 1993).0 
 
A. 
 "We exercise plenary review over the legal 
determinations of whether the requirements for abstention have 
been met.  [Citations omitted.]  Once we determine that the 
requirements have been met, we review a district court's decision 
to abstain under Younger abstention principles for abuse of 
discretion."  Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 
970 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
1. 
 We need not belabor the question of whether a BAA 
proceeding is "judicial in nature."  Clearly, it is.  See 
Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Ed., 662 F.2d 1008, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 
1981).0  The more compelling issue is whether, in the present 
                                                           
0
 Even if these three elements are satisfied, abstention 
is not appropriate where the federal claimant makes a showing of 
bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance. 
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435.  We note that, in the present case, 
no such extraordinary circumstances exist. 
0
 Under 12 Phila. City Code § 12-2807, hearings must be 
conducted "in a fair and appropriate manner."  The defendant may 
call witnesses, supplement testimony by affidavits, and interpose 
legal arguments.  While the technical rules of evidence do not 
apply, "all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value may 
be received."  Testimony must be given under oath.  A record of 
the proceeding must be made.  The hearing examiner is authorized 
to conduct extensive fact-finding and to compel the production of 
any document, paper, or record relevant to the violation charged. 
He must issue his decision based on the evidence and arguments 
offered. 
13 
case, there is a "pending" state proceeding inasmuch as O'Neill 
and Goodman filed their federal lawsuit in lieu of appealing the 
hearing examiner's determination, and in lieu of raising their 
constitutional claims in the state forum. 
 It is a well-settled that, "[f]or Younger purposes, the 
State's trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary system, 
and for a federal court to disrupt its integrity by intervening 
in midprocess would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State 
as sovereign."  New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City 
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989) ("NOPSI").  Thus, "a 
necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party [wishing to 
contest in federal court the judgment of a state judicial 
tribunal] must exhaust his state appellate remedies before 
seeking relief in the District Court."  Id., quoting Huffman v. 
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Under 12 Phila. City Code § 12-2808(2), the Parking 
Appeals Panel: 
 
shall have the power to review the facts and 
the law, and shall have power to affirm the 
determination or to reverse or modify any 
determination appealed from for error of fact 
or law, or to remand for additional 
proceedings, or, in appropriate cases, to 
hear the matter de novo. 
 
 See, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 423 (holding state 
bar disciplinary proceedings judicial in nature where local 
attorney ethics committees act as an arm of the state supreme 
court in performing the function of receiving and investigating 
complaints and holding hearings).  But see New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 369-73 
(1989) (holding ratemaking proceeding not judicial in nature 
because the setting of future utility rates essentially is a 
legislative act). 
14 
 In contrast to Huffman, where the federal claimant had 
failed to appeal a state trial court judgment against it, here, 
O'Neill and Goodman have failed to seek state-court judicial 
review of an order entered in a state administrative proceeding. 
We are faced, then, with the question left unanswered by the 
Supreme Court in NOPSI: whether a state proceeding is "pending," 
and Younger abstention proper, where the adjudicatory process has 
become final as a result of the federal claimant's failure to 
pursue state-court judicial review of an unfavorable state 
administrative determination?  491 U.S. at 369 & n.4 (1989). 
 The Courts of Appeals have furnished contradictory 
answers to this question.  Compare Thomas v. Texas State Bd. of 
Med. Exam., 807 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding "mere 
availability of state judicial review of state administrative 
proceedings does not amount to the pendency of state judicial 
proceedings within the meaning of Younger") with Alleghany Corp. 
v. Pomeroy, 898 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding district court 
should have abstained where Alleghany had filed action in federal 
court instead of appealing state administrative decision to North 
Dakota state courts). 
 We have been given no reason why a litigant in a state 
administrative proceeding should be permitted to forego state-
court judicial review of the agency's decision in order to apply 
for relief in federal court.  Rather, we find the grounds offered 
by the Supreme Court to support its holding in Huffman -- that 
state appellate review of a state court judgment must be 
exhausted before federal court intervention is permitted -- are 
15 
equally persuasive when considered with respect to state-court 
judicial review of a state administrative determination.0 
 First, federal intervention before a state court has 
had the opportunity to review an agency's decision is no less an 
"aspersion on the capabilities and good-faith of state appellate 
courts," and no "less a disruption of the State's efforts to 
protect interests which it deems important," 420 U.S. at 608, 
than the federal intervention with the state judicial appellate 
process explicitly condemned in Huffman.  Second, federal 
                                                           
0
 We find no inconsistency between our holding and the 
principle that administrative remedies need not be exhausted 
prior to bringing a § 1983 action in federal court.  Patsy v. 
Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).  As the Supreme 
Court stated in Dayton Christian Schools: 
 
The application of Younger principles to 
pending state administrative proceedings is 
fully consistent with Patsy . . . , which 
holds that litigants need not exhaust their 
administrative remedies prior to bringing a 
§ 1983 suit in federal court.  Cf. Huffman v. 
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607-11 (1975). 
Unlike Patsy, the administrative proceedings 
here are coercive rather than remedial, began 
before any substantial advancement in the 
federal action took place, and involve an 
important state interest. 
 
477 U.S. at 627-28 n.2.  The critical distinction between Dayton 
Christian Schools and Patsy is that Patsy involved a remedial 
action brought by the plaintiff to vindicate a wrong which had 
been inflicted by the State.  In contrast, Dayton Christian 
Schools involved an administrative proceedings initiated by the 
State, before a state forum, to enforce a violation of state law. 
That is, in Dayton Christian Schools, the action taken by the 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission was coercive rather than remedial, 
just as the action taken by the City of Philadelphia, to enforce 
its traffic tickets against O'Neill and Goodman, was coercive 
action which the plaintiffs sought to circumvent by filing their 
complaint in federal court. 
16 
intervention which would annul the results of an agency 
determination would deprive "the States of a function which quite 
legitimately is left to them," i.e., the disposition of 
constitutional issues which arise in litigation over which they 
have jurisdiction.  Id. at 609. 
 The requirement that litigants pursue state-court 
judicial review of state administrative decisions serves two 
additional purposes, identified by the Eighth Circuit in Pomeroy, 
which go to the very heart of the "comity" concerns upon which 
Younger abstention is grounded: (1) "the state courts may 
construe state law in a way which renders a constitutional 
decision unnecessary," id. 898 F.2d at 1317, citing Penzoil Co. 
v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (stating that an "important 
reason for abstention is to avoid unwarranted determination of 
federal constitutional questions"), and (2) "interests of comity 
are advanced, and friction reduced, if the courts of a state, 
rather than the federal courts, determine that the United States 
Constitution requires the state to alter its practices." Pomeroy, 
898 F.2d at 1318. 
 We therefore hold that state proceedings remain 
"pending," within the meaning of Younger abstention, in cases 
such as the one before us, where a coercive administrative 
proceeding has been initiated by the State in a state forum, 
where adequate state-court judicial review of the administrative 
determination is available to the federal claimants, and where 
the claimants have chosen not to pursue their state-court 
17 
judicial remedies, but have instead sought to invalidate the 
State's judgment by filing a federal action. 
 
2. 
 The second prong of the Middlesex test is whether the 
proceedings at issue implicate an important state interest.  This 
factor goes to the very core of the raison d'etre of Younger 
abstention inasmuch as the Supreme Court's holding in Younger 
rested primarily on considerations of "comity," a concept which 
encompasses "a proper respect for state functions."  401 U.S. at 
44. 
 Accordingly, "when we inquire into the substantiality 
of the State's interest in its proceedings we do not look 
narrowly to its interest in the outcome of the particular case --
which could arguably be offset by a substantial federal interest 
in the opposite outcome.  Rather, what we look to is the 
importance of the generic proceedings to the State."  NOPSI, 491 
U.S. at 364-65. 
 It would well nigh be impossible to overstate the point 
that the federal courts have no interest whatsoever in the 
underlying subject matter of this litigation -- the City of 
Philadelphia's on-street parking regulations.  In contrast, the 
City of Philadelphia has a vital and critical interest in the 
functioning of a regulatory system, such as the one at issue 
here, which is intimately associated with the physical and 
financial workings of the city in general, and of the municipal 
government in particular. 
18 
 Prior Supreme Court decisions have held that the states 
have a substantial interest in enforcing criminal laws that bear 
a close relationship to criminal proceedings, Huffman, 420 U.S. 
at 604, in regulating attorney conduct, Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 
434, in administering child custody proceedings, Moore v. Sims, 
442 U.S. 415 (1979), in preventing sex discrimination against 
employees, Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. at 628, and in 
regulating intrastate utility rates.  NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365.0 
 We do not believe that we exaggerate the scope of these 
decisions in holding that the City of Philadelphia has a 
significant and substantial interest in the regulation of on-
street parking, and in the vindication of the system it has 
implemented to adjudicate violations of those regulations.0 The 
                                                           
0
 We have held that the states have a substantial 
interest in education, Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Ed., 662 F.2d 
at 1017-18 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that state's interest in 
education is not weakened by the fact that, technically, local 
school boards press disciplinary charges against teachers, and 
not the State), and in regulating securities transactions.  Olde 
Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d at 212 (3d Cir. 1993).  See also 
Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. City of Hollister, 989 F.2d 359, 
361 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding important state interest in 
regulating mobile home parks even though rental rates are 
regulated by local ordinance rather than statewide law); Federal 
Express Corp. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 925 F.2d 962, 969 
(6th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's finding important 
state interest in regulating intrastate trucking). 
0
 The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he importance 
of the state interest may be demonstrated by the fact that the 
noncriminal proceedings has a close relationship to proceedings 
criminal in nature."  Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432.  Until May 31, 
1989, of course, parking infractions in the City of Philadelphia 
were criminal offenses.  Simply because parking violations are 
the least threatening of all motor vehicle violations -- and are 
now civil offenses in the City of Philadelphia -- does not mean 
that the State's overriding interest in enforcing its motor 
vehicle laws, many of which remain criminal in nature, has had 
its importance diluted. 
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plaintiffs, in fact, have conceded as much in their supplemental 
brief.  See Appellee's Supp. Br. at 1 ("This case involves the 
regulation and administration of on-street parking which, of 
course, is an important interest to the State of Pennsylvania and 
the City of Philadelphia."). 
 
3. 
 The third prong of our inquiry is whether the claimant 
is afforded an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional 
claims in the state forum.  The Supreme Court has held that this 
third element is satisfied in the context of a state 
administrative proceeding when the federal claimant can assert 
his constitutional claims during state-court judicial review of 
the administrative determination.  Dayton Christian Schools, 477 
U.S. at 629; Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 436.  Moreover, "when a 
litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in 
related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume 
that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the 
absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary."  Penzoil Co. 
v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. at 15. 
 In the present case, neither O'Neill nor Goodman 
attempted to raise his federal claims in the state proceedings. 
Accordingly, we would be well-justified in assuming that, had 
they done so, they would have been afforded an adequate remedy.0  
                                                           
0
 In Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Ed., 662 F.2d 1008 (3d 
Cir. 1981), we held that a federal claimant is afforded an 
opportunity to assert her constitutional claims in the state 
forum where an administrative board is authorized to dismiss the 
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In any event, it is undisputed that O'Neill and Goodman could 
have raised their constitutional arguments before the 
administrative review board, again in the state-court appellate 
process, to and through the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and, 
ultimately, before the United States Supreme Court.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1257(a).0 
B. 
 In sum, we hold that the three-prong test for Younger 
abstention is satisfied in the present case.  The BAA proceeding 
was a judicial proceeding which may be deemed "pending" as a 
result of O'Neill's and Goodman's failure to take advantage of 
the appellate remedies which were available to them.  The 
implementation of Philadelphia's procedures for adjudicating 
parking tickets implicates important state (and not federal) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
charges against the claimant.  In this respect, we note that the 
BAA Parking Appeals Panel is authorized "to review the facts and 
the law, and shall have the power to affirm the [hearing 
examiner's] determination or to reverse or modify any 
determination appealed from for error of fact or law, or to 
remand for additional proceedings, or, in appropriate cases, to 
hear the matter de novo."  12 Phila. City Code § 12-2808(2). 
0
 28 U.S.C. § 1257 provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
 (a) Final judgments or decrees rendered 
by the highest court of a State in which a 
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where 
. . . the validity of a statute of any State 
is drawn in question on the ground of its 
being repugnant to the Constitution, 
treaties, or laws of the United States, or 
where any title, right, privilege, or 
immunity is specially set up or claimed under 
the Constitution . . . . 
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interests.  Lastly, O'Neill and Goodman could have asserted their 
constitutional claims in the state proceedings. 
 Anxious though we may be "to vindicate and protect 
federal rights and federal interests," Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 
considerations of comity demand that we remain sensitive to the 
legitimate interests of the states.  Since this case does not 
involve any of the extraordinary circumstances which would 
otherwise make abstention inappropriate, we hold that the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to abstain from 
hearing O'Neill and Goodman's federal claims in deference to the 
overwhelming interest of the City of Philadelphia and the State 
of Pennsylvania with respect to their on-street parking 
regulations. 
 
IV 
 Therefore, we will vacate the district court's judgment 
of March 29, 1993, and remand this case to the district court 
with instructions to abstain under Younger v. Harris, and to 
dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. 
 Costs will be taxed against O'Neill and Goodman. 
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John O'Neill, et al. v. City of Philadelphia, et al. 
No. 93-1378 
 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 Chief Justice Marshall may well have overstated his 
point when, writing for the Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), he stated: "We have no more right to 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to 
usurp that which is not given.  The one or the other would be 
treason to the constitution."  Marshall's absolutist view of the 
federal courts' duty to exercise the jurisdiction Congress and 
the Constitution afford them is frequently quoted, but of course, 
it has not been faithfully followed.0  Abstention decisions, 
among others, demonstrate that federal courts can and do decline 
to hear cases that they have the constitutional and statutory 
authority to decide.  But see New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New 
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) ("NOPSI") (stating that 
"federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise 
of jurisdiction that has been conferred", and describing 
                                                           
0
 Professor Shapiro has pointed out that the circumstances of 
Cohens, a case requiring Marshall to assert and defend 
the Supreme Court's authority to review state court 
decisions, might account for the "frightening" tenor 
and content of his pronouncement. David L. Shapiro, 
"Jurisdiction and Discretion," 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 
543-44 (1985).  He suggests as well that on at least 
one other occasion, in Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 240, 264 (1804), Marshall seemed to 
recognize that federal courts did retain a degree of 
discretion not to exercise jurisdiction that 
undoubtedly existed.  Id. at 545 n.12 and accompanying 
text. 
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abstention cases as merely restricting the availability and 
timing of certain forms of relief).  Nonetheless, the ideal 
behind Marshall's statement in Cohens remains a meaningful one; 
even the decisions disproving its accuracy recognize and come to 
terms with the significant degree of truth to its directive.  In 
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 
U.S. 800 (1976), for example, where the Supreme Court concluded 
that federal jurisdiction should not be exercised, it cautioned 
that abstention "represents an extraordinary and narrow exception 
to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy 
properly before it."  Id. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v. 
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)).  This 
"obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction 
given them," the Court later emphasized, is "virtually 
unflagging."  Id. at 817; see also NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (same); 
Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (same).  Thus, as 
we recently reiterated, "[a]bstention is the exception and not 
the rule."  Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1994); 
see also NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (same); Colorado River, 424 U.S. 
at 813 (same).  "Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can 
be justified under this doctrine only in exceptional 
circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the 
State court would clearly serve an important countervailing 
interest."  Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 
County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188-89). 
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 In light of these well-established principles, I 
believe that the majority's expansion of the Younger abstention 
doctrine is clearly unwarranted.  This area of the law is no 
place for inflexible absolutes.  (With all due respect to Chief 
Justice Marshall, not even he could convince me that my 
colleagues in the majority have committed treason to the 
Constitution.)  But at the very least, a federal court's reasons 
for abdicating its responsibility to decide cases over which it 
has jurisdiction should be quite strong.  In my view, the reasons 
supporting the majority's decision that abstention is mandated 
here are not nearly adequate. 
I. 
 The plaintiff-appellees, John O'Neill and Samuel 
Goodman, initiated proceedings in Philadelphia's (the City) 
Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (BAA) to challenge several 
parking tickets they had received.  In response to Goodman's and 
O'Neill's requests, the BAA scheduled hearings to review their 
tickets.  In addition, however, the BAA decided that at the same 
time, it would adjudicate a group of older tickets that the 
plaintiffs had received prior to June, 1989.  When the plaintiffs 
discovered this, they objected that the BAA did not have the 
authority to make rulings on the older tickets.  The BAA hearing 
examiners who presided over their cases rejected these 
arguments.0 
                                                           
0
 The BAA does not, and legally cannot, initiate hearings to 
review parking tickets.  As I discuss below, it is not 
a court of record.  It has no authority to issue a 
summons or a warrant, nor can it enter a civil 
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 The City concedes and in fact relies on the point that 
in deciding to adjudicate Goodman's and O'Neill's older (pre-
June, 1989) parking tickets, the BAA hearing examiners plainly 
failed to follow the local ordinance setting forth the agency's 
powers and procedures. See Phila. City Code § 2800 et seq.  A 
provision of that ordinance states that if a person elects to 
contest a parking ticket he received prior to the date the 
ordinance became effective, he must consent to the BAA's 
jurisdiction to adjudicate that ticket.  Phila. City Code 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
judgment.  App. at 404-05.  The majority describes the 
administrative proceedings that occurred here as 
"coercive" action taken by the City. Maj. Op. at 15-16 
n.13.  In my view, that is not correct.  The only 
conceivably coercive, proactive conduct the BAA took in 
this case was directly prohibited by local ordinance. 
 
The facts of Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian 
Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986), which the majority views as 
describing "coercive" state-initiated action similar to that 
which occurred here, are notably different.  In Dayton 
Christian Schools, a state agency acting within its lawful 
authority initiated an administrative action against a 
private school by filing a complaint.  Id. at 624.  While 
those administrative proceedings were pending, the school 
filed a § 1983 suit in federal district court.  Here, in 
contrast, Goodman and O'Neill initiated the administrative 
process by requesting a hearing.  The BAA did not and could 
not require them to do so.  It is legally incapable of 
coercing participation by unwilling individuals.  The agency 
did act independently and contrary to the plaintiffs' wishes 
when it assumed jurisdiction over their older tickets.  As 
the City points out, however, that action was flatly 
prohibited by local ordinance.  The City thus describes the 
state action challenged here as an unfortunate and legally 
indefensible (but not unconstitutional) mistake.  In 
deciding to adjudicate Goodman's and O'Neill's older 
tickets, therefore, the BAA hearing officers were acting 
contrary to the state's interests and instructions; they 
were not acting in furtherance of the state's valid goals. I 
discuss the legal significance of these facts below.  For 
now, I only mean to set them straight. 
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§ 2807(8).  The ordinance went into effect on June 1, 1989.  The 
plaintiffs did not consent to and, in fact, expressly challenged 
the BAA's jurisdiction to adjudicate their older tickets.  Thus, 
the BAA hearing examiners acted contrary to law in addressing the 
infractions that Goodman and O'Neill had been charged with 
committing prior to June, 1989. 
  The fact that the hearing examiners overlooked the 
clear requirements of an applicable provision of the City Code is 
understandable.  Their job is to fairly and efficiently dispose 
of challenges to parking tickets, a task that generally does not 
require any extensive legal training or research.  While the 
record does not provide a comprehensive description of the 
educational and professional backgrounds of BAA hearing 
examiners, I think we can safely assume that they are not 
attorneys.  Dominic Ceremeli -- who, as a Deputy Director of 
Finance in charge of BAA operations, supervises the hearing 
examiners, acts as an instructor during their training, and 
presides over hearings himself when needed -- testified during 
his deposition that he is a high school graduate, has some 
college education but no degree, and has not attended law school. 
Presumably, at least as a general matter, the hearing examiners 
serving under Ceremeli do not possess more advanced legal 
credentials. 
 And given the job that hearing examiners do, they 
should not need much specialized training in the law.  The 
examiners are not expected to evaluate complex legal arguments. 
They determine what happened and decide whether that conduct 
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constituted a parking violation.  Accordingly, in the chapter of 
the Parking Hearing Examiner Manual that covers defenses that 
ticket recipients might raise, the subject of federal statutory 
or constitutional rights never comes up.  Instead, the examiners 
learn, for example, that a "Going to the Bathroom" defense should 
not succeed; after all, the Manual correctly explains, "This is a 
risk all drivers take."  App. at 213.0  I do not mean to 
trivialize the important and often difficult work that the BAA 
and its hearing examiners do in adjudicating challenges to 
parking tickets.  It is clear, however, that nobody in or outside 
City government has ever believed that the people who preside 
over this administrative process would possess either the 
inclination or ability to evaluate the kind of claims that arise 
under the federal civil rights statutes.  Quite simply, that is 
not the BAA's job.  See BAA "Mission Statement", App. at 174 
(describing the BAA's purpose and goals, which include fairness 
and efficiency but not the protection of federal rights). 
 Goodman and O'Neill could have initiated an 
administrative appeal before the Parking Appeals Panel within 
thirty days of the date on which the hearing officers entered 
final determinations in their cases.  They did not do so. Rather, 
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 The tone and content of the Manual further supports my 
belief that the BAA hearing examiners are not 
attorneys.  Otherwise, the Manual would not need to 
inform its readers that "[t]he legal system over 
hundreds of years has developed very complicated rules 
of evidence."  App. at 187.  Nor, presumably, would it 
contain advice like: "It is important that you listen 
carefully and pay attention"; or, "In addition to 
paying attention, it is important that a Hearing 
Examiner does not lose his temper."  App. at 184. 
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more than seven months after Goodman's hearing and two months 
after O'Neill's, they filed this § 1983 suit in federal district 
court, claiming, among other things, that by adjudicating their 
older tickets, the City had deprived them of property without due 
process of law in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
Significantly, then, when Goodman and O'Neill initiated their 
suit in federal court, the state administrative process was over.  
Nothing was pending before the BAA, and any effort the plaintiffs 
might have made to return there to revive and pursue their 
administrative proceedings would have been rejected as time-
barred.  See City's Supp. Br. at 3 (stating that the plaintiffs 
have foregone their opportunity for appellate review, and that 
"[i]t is therefore no longer possible for the federal court to 
retain jurisdiction while awaiting the outcome of a state 
proceeding . . . .").  Thus, there has not been, and there could 
not have been, ongoing legal activity at the state level since 
prior to the time Goodman and O'Neill brought this case. 
 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the 
City had deprived them of their due process rights and entered 
summary judgment in their favor.  The City has appealed that 
decision. 
II.   
 Like the majority, I recognize that the abstention 
question this case presents is an open one.  The Supreme Court 
has not provided an answer, and the courts of appeals have 
reached conflicting results.  Compare Allegheny Corp. v. Pomeroy, 
898 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1990) (agreeing with the majority) with 
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Thomas v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 807 F.2d 453 
(5th Cir. 1987) (agreeing with me).  The majority concludes that 
the district court abused its discretion by failing to abstain 
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the cases 
following and extending Younger's rationale.  I disagree. 
A. 
 In Younger, supra, the Supreme Court held that absent 
extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should abstain from 
enjoining ongoing state criminal prosecutions.  The decision 
rested on several grounds.  The first was the "basic doctrine of 
equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and 
particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, 
when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not 
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."  Younger, 
401 U.S. at 43-44.  Clearly, this principle has no relevance 
here.  Goodman and O'Neill have never been subject to anything 
resembling a criminal prosecution.  Additionally, there is no 
ongoing state proceeding to enjoin.  And lastly, because the 
plaintiffs cannot return to the BAA administrative process, they 
have no means of seeking adequate relief for their alleged 
constitutional injury through alternative legal avenues. 
 However, as the Court has recognized in extending 
Younger abstention beyond the context of criminal prosecutions, 
there is more to this doctrine than "the accepted rule that 
equity will not enjoin the prosecution of a crime."  Trainor v. 
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977).  The Younger Court also 
"voiced a `more vital consideration,' namely, that in a union 
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where both the States and the Federal Government are sovereign 
entities, there are basic concerns of federalism which counsel 
against interference by federal courts, through injunction or 
otherwise, with legitimate state functions, particularly with the 
operation of state courts."  Trainor, 431 U.S. at 441 (citation 
omitted).  These somewhat ill-defined but significant 
considerations of comity and federalism are the ones on which the 
majority relies in reaching its conclusion.  In my view, however, 
this case does not implicate such concerns to the extent 
necessary to justify a decision mandating abstention under the 
Younger doctrine. 
 The most significant and frequently cited reason 
federal courts have articulated for abstaining under Younger has 
been the importance of not interfering with state proceedings. 
See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (stating that Younger and its 
progeny "espouse a strong policy against interference with 
pending state judicial proceedings"); Trainor, 431 U.S. at 445-46 
(applying Younger abstention to avoid "interrupting [state] 
enforcement proceedings pending decision of the federal court" 
and the "disruption of suits by the State in its sovereign 
capacity").  It is important, we have repeatedly stated, to keep 
clear of pending state cases.  E.g., Coruzzi v. New Jersey, 705 
F.2d 688, 690 (1983) ("The Younger abstention doctrine rests on 
the strong federal policy on noninterference with pending state 
judicial proceedings.")  For this reason, "[a] federal court may 
consider Younger abstention when the requested equitable relief 
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would constitute federal interference in state judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings."  Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d at 882 (citing 
Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 431, and Huffman v. 
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1975)).  But where such 
interference will not occur, "the principles of comity underlying 
Younger abstention are not implicated."  Id. (quoting Gwynedd 
Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1201 
(3d Cir. 1992)).  As the Supreme Court put it in Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974), "the relevant principles of 
equity, comity, and federalism `have little force in the absence 
of a pending state proceeding.'"   In such circumstances, the 
Court explained, a federal court can exercise its given 
jurisdiction without creating duplicative legal proceedings or 
disrupting the state system; nor could a decision allowing the 
federal suit to go forward "be interpreted as reflecting 
negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce 
constitutional principles."  Id. 
 Here, once again, there was no pending state proceeding 
when Goodman and O'Neill initiated their federal suit. Therefore, 
there was nothing with which the district court could have 
interfered by exercising jurisdiction over the case. Indeed, the 
court did exercise its jurisdiction in reaching the merits of the 
plaintiffs' claims, and no such interference took place.  Because 
the BAA process was over, it could not have been disrupted.  Even 
had the district court made a conscious and determined effort to 
hinder the state from pursuing its important interests or 
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demonstrating its ability to recognize and protect federal 
rights, it could not have done so. 
 "Younger does not require federal plaintiffs to exhaust 
their appellate remedies unless the relief being sought from the 
federal court involves disruption of the state's judicial 
process."  Marks, 19 F.3d at 884 (emphasis added).  No such 
disruption is possible here.  The majority, nonetheless, 
concludes that abstention is not only appropriate, but that by 
exercising its jurisdiction, the district court committed an 
abuse of discretion.     
 The Younger doctrine is also said to serve the 
interests of comity and federalism by preventing federal courts 
from projecting any doubt that state courts can and will protect 
federal rights.  See, e.g., Trainor, 431 U.S. at 446 (basing 
decision to abstain on the desire to avoid disrupting state suits 
"combined with the negative reflection on the State's ability to 
adjudicate federal claims that occurs whenever a federal court 
enjoins a pending state proceeding").  According to the majority, 
this consideration supports its conclusion that abstention is 
required here.  It believes that by exercising jurisdiction over 
Goodman and O'Neill's § 1983 suit, the district court did in fact 
cast an "aspersion on the capabilities and good-faith" of the 
state system.  Maj. Op. at 16 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608). 
At least, the majority reasons, the insult was just as 
disparaging here as it would have been if the plaintiffs had 
commenced their federal action after losing in the Pennsylvania 
Court of Common Pleas.  Once again, I disagree.   
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 Goodman and O'Neill have alleged that the BAA examiners 
presiding over their administrative hearings made decisions which 
resulted in a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Instead of bringing an appeal before other administrative 
officials -- who, like the original examiners, are not attorneys 
and are not in the business of adjudicating § 1983 cases -- the 
plaintiffs went to federal court.  When they did so, they had 
never been before a state tribunal, nor had they ever had direct 
access to a state tribunal, that was competent to hear their 
federal claims.  Unlike judges in state trial courts, the 
officials who administer BAA proceedings (at both the hearing and 
appellate stages) cannot, as a practical or a legal matter, 
decide whether the City should be held liable for a deprivation 
of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.  That is a complicated 
question over which Article III judges have disagreed in this 
case.  State trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 
§ 1983 suits, and Pennsylvania's judges are perfectly capable of 
handling them.  The BAA, in contrast, is not even a court.  The 
officials presiding over its hearings and appeals are not 
attorneys.  They do not possess either the training or the 
resources to adjudicate § 1983 suits.  Even if those limitations 
did not exist, the informal, streamlined procedural rules that 
govern BAA proceedings would prevent agency officials from 
performing this challenging job adequately.  Is it really such an 
insult to the state system to allow individuals allegedly 
deprived of constitutional rights at the first stage of such an 
administrative process to bring their § 1983 suit in federal 
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court, rather than first to proceed with an administrative appeal 
and then to pursue relief through the state courts? 
 The majority answers affirmatively.  The aspersion cast 
by a failure to abstain here, it states, would be equal in 
magnitude to that cast by permitting plaintiffs to go forward 
with federal actions after losing in state trial court.  But by 
not abstaining here, the district court did not displace a state 
court of appeals.  It displaced a BAA parking appeals panel. 
Would we actually offend Pennsylvania by allowing § 1983 
claimants to prefer a federal district court to the BAA?  Would 
the State even defend its agency's legal or practical ability to 
handle such a case?  Of course not.  When the plaintiffs suffered 
their alleged constitutional injury at their BAA hearings, they 
had a choice: they could appeal within the agency or they could 
bring suit in federal court.  The decision they made, in my view, 
does not disparage the good faith or the abilities of either BAA 
administrators or the state courts.  And I believe that 
Pennsylvania would agree; the Commonwealth is not so unrealistic 
or over-sensitive as the majority's argument might suggest.   
 So, in my view, the district court neither interfered 
with nor insulted the state system when it exercised its 
jurisdiction over this case, and those principal values of comity 
and federalism that Younger abstention serves are not 
significantly (or, arguably, even remotely) advanced by today's 
decision. 
 The majority, however, lists several additional comity 
concerns.  It points out that if we failed to require abstention 
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under the circumstances of this case, state courts would not be 
able to decide the constitutional issues that arise in disputes 
over which they have jurisdiction.  State courts would also lose 
the opportunity to construe state laws in a way which would make 
the resolution of federal constitutional questions unnecessary. 
And finally, the majority reasons, it is better to let state 
courts determine when the state must alter its practices to 
conform to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution; that way, 
the "friction" and resentment following federal decisions 
announcing such a mandate can be avoided, and the interests of 
comity are furthered. 
 I agree that if district courts exercise their 
jurisdiction over § 1983 suits brought after administrative 
decisions subject to eventual state judicial review, state courts 
would not get the opportunity to make preliminary determinations 
of state and (when necessary) federal law.0  However, if these 
comity concerns were sufficient to require the abdication of 
federal judicial responsibility to hear § 1983 cases, then we 
would require plaintiffs to exhaust their available state 
remedies before bringing such suits in federal court.  Of course, 
under the Supreme Court's holdings in Patsy v. Florida Board of 
Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982), and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
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 This case does not involve any difficult and unresolved 
issues of state law that, depending on their 
resolution, might affect or make unnecessary our 
treatment of the federal questions it presents.  If it 
did, we might properly abstain under Railroad Comm'n v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  The majority does 
not suggest that Pullman abstention would be 
appropriate here.  
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(1961), that is not necessary.  Section 1983 plaintiffs may 
forego opportunities to seek recourse through state 
administrative and judicial processes and elect to bring their 
federal claims, in the first instance, in federal court.  When 
they do so, as is often the case, state courts do not get the 
opportunity to decide the state and federal law questions that 
these disputes present.  The very same comity concerns that the 
majority relies on here give way to the overriding federal 
interest in adjudicating suits alleging a violation of federally 
protected rights.  The additional comity concerns the majority 
mentions are no more persuasive here than they were in Patsy, 
where the Supreme Court looked past them in holding that § 1983 
plaintiffs need not exhaust their administrative remedies before 
proceeding in federal court. See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 532-33 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (defending the exhaustion requirement as 
promoting the principles of comity recognized in Younger and 
criticizing the Court's decision as forsaking such 
considerations). 
 In Marks v. Stinson, we recognized that "Younger 
principles must be applied in a manner consistent with [the] 
well-established proposition" set forth in Patsy.  Marks, 19 F.3d 
at 882.  Unlike the plaintiff in Patsy, however, Goodman and 
O'Neill had already been through one stage of the state 
administrative process when they commenced their suit in federal 
court.  The majority believes that once plaintiffs initiate BAA 
proceedings, they cannot be permitted to leave the state system 
without exhausting their appellate remedies.  I agree that Patsy 
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does not control here.  However, today's decision strikes me as 
more about exhaustion than abstention.  In my view, this case is 
far closer to Patsy than it is to Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 457 
U.S. 592 (1975), and the other cases requiring Younger 
abstention. 
 In Huffman, supra, the sheriff and prosecuting attorney 
of a county in Ohio brought suit under a public nuisance statute 
against the owner of a theater that showed pornographic films. 
Following trial, the state court ruled in Ohio's favor.  It 
issued a judgment ordering the theater to close for one year and 
authorizing the state to seize and sell property used in the 
theater's operation.  The next day, rather than filing an appeal, 
the theater owner brought suit in federal district court alleging 
that Ohio's application of its nuisance law was unconstitutional 
and asking for an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the 
state trial court's judgment.   
 The Supreme Court held that the district court should 
have abstained under Younger.  In reaching that conclusion, it 
relied heavily on "the policy of noninterference" with cases that 
are pending before state courts.  Huffman, 422 U.S. at 599-605. 
The theater owner had argued that after the state trial court 
entered its judgment, there was no ongoing proceeding to disrupt. 
The Supreme Court rejected that position.  Huffman, 420 U.S. at 
608 ("[A] necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in 
appellee's posture must exhaust state appellate remedies before 
seeking relief in the District Court . . . .").  Its reasons for 
doing so, which are not applicable here, fully convey the 
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differences between Huffman and the case before us.  The Court 
stated: 
 Virtually all of the evils at which 
Younger is directed would inhere in federal 
intervention prior to completion of state 
appellate proceedings, just as surely as they 
would if such intervention occurred at or 
before trial.  Intervention at the later 
stage is if anything more duplicative, since 
an entire trial has already taken place, and 
it is also a direct aspersion on the 
capabilities and good faith of the state 
appellate courts.  Nor, in these state-
initiated nuisance proceedings, is federal 
intervention at the appellate stage any the 
less a disruption of the State's efforts to 
protect interests which it deems important. 
Indeed, it is likely to be even more 
disruptive and offensive because the State 
has already won a nisi prius determination 
that its valid policies are being violated in 
a fashion which justifies judicial abatement. 
 
 Federal post-trial intervention, in a 
fashion designed to annul the results of a 
state trial, also deprives the states of a 
function which quite legitimately is left to 
them, that of overseeing trial court 
dispositions of constitutional issues which 
arise in civil litigation over which they 
have jurisdiction.  We think this 
consideration to be of some importance 
because it is typically a judicial system's 
appellate courts which are by their nature a 
litigant's most appropriate forum for the 
resolution of constitutional contentions. 
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608-09.  Again, virtually none of those 
justifications for abstention apply here.  Federal adjudication 
of the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims would not be duplicative of the 
BAA hearings; the hearing examiners could not and did not address 
the constitutional implications of their decisions.  As I have 
already explained, displacing a parking appeals panel is entirely 
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different than displacing a state appellate court, and the former 
does not cast any aspersion on the good faith or abilities of 
state institutions.  Unlike Huffman, in this case the district 
court did not disrupt a state-initiated proceeding commenced to 
protect interests which the state deems important.  Rather, it 
was Goodman and O'Neill who initiated the BAA process.  (The 
agency, recall, is powerless to do so itself.)  And the state 
action giving rise to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims has 
not been deemed important to the state but has instead been 
characterized as an unfortunate and unlawful mistake committed by 
individual administrative officials.  Finally, while state 
appellate courts might provide the litigant's "most appropriate 
forum for the resolution of constitutional contentions", Id. at 
609, one could hardly say the same thing about a parking appeals 
panel.  Such a suggestion, in fact, would reflect a more 
insulting view of the state judiciary than any decision declining 
to abstain under Younger. 
 The majority also states that Dayton Christian Schools, 
supra, is more applicable here than Patsy.  See Maj. Op. at 15-16 
n.13.  The federal plaintiff in Patsy, it reasons, initiated a 
remedial action to vindicate a wrong which had been inflicted by 
the State.  Dayton Christian Schools is different, in the 
majority's view, because like the case before us, it involved 
coercive administrative proceedings initiated by the State to 
enforce a violation of state law.  But Goodman and O'Neill's 
§ 1983 suit is remedial -- not, as the majority suggests, purely 
defensive.  The plaintiffs claim that the BAA hearing examiners 
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violated their due process rights in deciding to adjudicate their 
older tickets, and they have sought relief for that wrong in 
federal court.  True, they could have pursued the same remedy 
through an administrative appeal and then through the state court 
system.  Under the principles of Patsy, however, which I believe 
are applicable here, they need not have exhausted their state 
administrative and judicial options.  Additionally, unlike the 
federal plaintiffs in cases like Huffman, Dayton Christian 
Schools, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), Trainor v. 
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 
(1979), and Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. 423 (1982), 
Goodman and O'Neill have never been targets of state-initiated 
legal proceedings.  While the majority states that the BAA 
process was coercive, the fact is that the BAA cannot adjudicate 
tickets unless recipients request a hearing.  Again, the agency 
does not have the legal power to initiate its own process, and it 
cannot coercively subject anyone to its authority.  Thus, Goodman 
and O'Neill have not asked the district court for protection from 
the state's independent efforts to enforce its laws through an 
administrative proceeding directed against them.  Rather, after 
allegedly suffering a constitutional injury at the hands of state 
officials presiding over an administrative process that the 
plaintiffs initiated for their own benefit, they turned to the 
federal district court for relief instead of pursuing 
administrative and then judicial appeals within the state system. 
In these circumstances, it requires only the smallest extension 
of Patsy -- as compared to a far greater and less reasonable 
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extrapolation of Huffman, Dayton Christian Schools, and other 
decisions requiring Younger abstention -- to permit § 1983 
plaintiffs to go forward with their claims in federal court. 
 Our prior decision in Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1986), 
supports this view.  Kentucky West involved a dispute between two 
gas companies and the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission 
("PUC").  The companies initiated an administrative proceeding 
before the PUC seeking approval of a proposed rate increase.  The 
PUC denied their request, and the companies challenged that 
determination in state court.  Shortly thereafter, they filed 
suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief.  The federal complaint alleged that Pennsylvania's 
regulatory scheme and the PUC's decision were either preempted by 
federal statute or unconstitutional under the commerce and equal 
protection clauses.  The district court dismissed the companies' 
suit under Burford and Younger abstention.  We reversed, stating: 
"In the typical Younger case, the federal 
plaintiff is a defendant in ongoing or 
threatened state court proceedings seeking to 
enjoin a continuation of those state 
proceedings."  Crawley v. Hamilton County 
Comm'rs, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1984).  In 
this case, on the other hand, the federal 
plaintiffs -- [the gas companies] -- are also 
the state plaintiffs.  Moreover, they are not 
seeking to enjoin any state judicial 
proceeding; instead, they simply desire to 
litigate what is admittedly a federal 
question in a federal court, having agreed to 
dismiss their pending state appeal if the 
district court assumes jurisdiction over the 
merits of their complaint. 
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 Under the circumstances, then, we 
believe that the balance of state and federal 
interests tips decidedly away from abstention 
under Younger. . . . To deny [the gas 
companies] access to a federal forum simply 
because of their pending state appeal would 
be at odds with a fundamental premise of our 
federal judicial system: that is, "that where 
Congress has granted concurrent jurisdiction, 
a plaintiff is free to bring suit in both the 
state and federal forums for the same cause 
of action."  [New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. 
Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 769 (3d Cir. 1978).] 
Kentucky West, 791 F.2d at 1117.  In Marks v. Stinson, we 
recently reaffirmed the principles set forth in Kentucky West in 
holding that Younger abstention was not appropriate where the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction would not interfere with 
parallel state proceedings.  Marks, 19 F.3d at 885.  The 
plaintiffs in this case occupy the same position as the gas 
companies in Kentucky West: they have never been defendants in 
state administrative or judicial proceedings; rather, after 
allegedly suffering a deprivation of their federal rights as a 
result of a state administrative decision, they chose to seek 
relief in federal court.  Indeed, the argument for abstention was 
stronger in Kentucky West and Marks than it is here, as this case 
does not raise real concerns of interrupting ongoing litigation 
in state courts involving the same subject matter giving rise to 
the federal suit.  Our reasons for not abstaining previously, 
therefore, seem even more compelling in this case. 
 The First Circuit's decision in Kercado-Melendez v. 
Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1987), also counsels against 
a decision mandating abstention.  The plaintiff in that case, 
Kercado, worked for the Puerto Rico Department of Public 
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Instruction ("DPI") as a school district superintendent.  The 
Secretary of the DPI charged Kercado with incompetence and 
improper conduct.  After Kercado appeared at an informal DPI 
hearing at which the charges against her were addressed, she 
received an order dismissing her from her employment.  She had 
the option to appeal her termination within the DPI 
administrative appeals process but declined to do so.  Instead, 
Kercado filed a § 1983 suit in federal court alleging that she 
had been fired as a result of her political affiliations in 
violation of her First Amendment rights, and further that the 
state had deprived her of due process by failing to provide her 
with a pre-termination hearing.  On appeal, the Secretary of the 
DPI argued "that because Kercado could have appealed the 
dismissal to the DPI Board of Appeals, the district court should 
have abstained and thereby forced Kercado to litigate her claims 
in a Puerto Rico forum."  Kercado-Melendez, 829 F.2d at 259.  "In 
effect," the court continued, the Secretary was arguing "that 
Kercado should not have been permitted to bring a section 1983 
suit in federal court because of the availability of an appeal 
within the Puerto Rico administrative and judicial apparatus." 
Id.  The majority takes precisely the same position here. 
 The First Circuit rejected the Secretary's argument. It 
explained that in Kercado-Melendez, unlike Dayton Christian 
Schools, 
the administrative proceeding is remedial 
rather than coercive.  The administrative 
appeal process could be triggered only on 
Kercado's initiative if she wished to pursue 
her remedies within the Puerto Rico 
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administrative framework.  Patsy holds that 
she was not required to do so. 
Id. at 260 (emphasis added).  The administrative process here, 
like the ones in Kercado-Melendez and Patsy and unlike the one in 
Dayton Christian Schools, could be triggered only on the 
plaintiffs' initiative.  The BAA was powerless to bring Goodman 
and O'Neill before it, and it was powerless to compel them to 
challenge the hearing examiners' decisions before a parking 
appeals panel.  Accordingly, I agree with the First Circuit's 
conclusion that the principles of Patsy are more applicable than 
those of Dayton Christian Schools or other decisions requiring 
Younger abstention.  As Kercado-Melendez explains, we should not 
fail "to recognize that there is a significant difference between 
a civil rights plaintiff who seeks to use the federal courts to 
stop or nullify an ongoing state proceeding in which she is a 
defendant, and a civil rights plaintiff who has an option to 
initiate a state proceeding to remedy a constitutional wrong 
perpetrated by a state actor."  Kercado-Melendez, 829 F.2d at 
261. 
B. 
 In reaching its conclusion that Younger abstention is 
mandated here, the majority seeks to protect and promote 
principles of comity and federalism.  I do not agree with its 
assessment of the harm those interests would suffer if we 
permitted the district court to exercise its jurisdiction. 
Additionally, although the majority barely acknowledges this 
point, there are other highly significant countervailing 
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interests at stake in suits brought under § 1983 which merit 
serious consideration in any discussion of Younger abstention. 
The majority's analysis overlooks this second side of the balance 
(after overestimating the first).  In doing so, it produces a 
result with deeply troubling implications.    
 When it enacted § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983), "Congress intended to "`throw 
open the doors of the United States courts' to individuals who 
were threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of 
constitutional rights, and to provide these individuals immediate 
access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of 
state law to the contrary."  Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504 (citation 
omitted) (quoting legislative history).  Thus, as the Court 
explained in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972): "The 
very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts 
between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's 
federal rights . . . ."  In enacting legislation to make the 
federal courts "the primary and powerful reliances" for 
vindicating federal rights under § 1983, Steffel, 415 U.S. at 464 
(emphasis in original), Congress was fully aware of and 
undeterred by competing concerns of comity and federalism.  As 
the Court has stated, "Congress clearly conceived that it was 
altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with 
respect to the protection of federally created rights."  Mitchum, 
407 U.S. at 242.  It did so, nonetheless, to create "a uniquely 
federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of 
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state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of 
the Nation."  Id. at 239.   
 Today, the majority holds that individuals allegedly 
deprived of constitutional rights during the adjudication of 
their claims before a state agency cannot pursue a § 1983 claim 
in federal court -- even after the administrative process is no 
longer pending, and even when they no longer have any recourse 
within the state system.0  Under the majority's ruling, the only 
federal forum such plaintiffs will ever stand a chance of 
reaching is the United States Supreme Court; and for a number of 
easily appreciated reasons, that chance is remote.  By so 
drastically limiting (if not, for all practical purposes, 
foreclosing) access to the federal courts, today's decision runs 
directly counter to the purposes Congress sought to achieve in 
enacting the civil rights legislation under which the plaintiffs 
brought this suit.   
 Thus, in concluding that the district court committed 
an abuse of discretion by exercising its jurisdiction, the 
                                                           
0
 I agree with the majority's point that the plaintiffs lost 
their opportunity to pursue administrative and then 
judicial appeals in the state system as a result of 
their own conduct.  In my view, however, Younger 
abstention is not a device to keep litigants from 
choosing a federal forum when we feel their cases are 
better suited to the state agencies or courts.  Rather, 
it is a principle of restraint exercised only where the 
exercise of jurisdiction would inflict overriding harm 
to competing values of comity and federalism. 
Abstention serves to protect state interests and 
maintain a strong, respectful relationship between the 
governments making up the federal system -- not to 
deter prospective plaintiffs from attempting to 
vindicate their federal rights in federal court.   
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majority not only overstates the extent to which comity and 
federalism concerns are implicated in this case; in addition, and 
of potentially greater significance, its analysis fails to take 
into account the vital federal and individual interests at stake 
in the adjudication of any case brought under § 1983. 
III. 
 Because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
the district court abused its discretion by failing to abstain 
under Younger, I will comment very briefly on the merits of the 
plaintiffs claims.  In my view, there are none. 
 First, the City is the only remaining defendant in the 
case, and the plaintiffs have not established that the alleged 
violation of their constitutional rights occurred as a result of 
an official custom, practice, or policy under the standard for 
municipal liability set forth in Monell v. Dept. of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and the related line of cases.  In 
fact, the City adopted an ordinance expressly prohibiting the 
decision that gave rise to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. 
The officials who presided over Goodman's and O'Neill's hearings 
overlooked that provision of the City Code, but Philadelphia 
cannot be held liable for those mistakes.0   
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 The plaintiffs argue that even if the hearing examiners had 
complied with the ordinance and refrained from 
adjudicating their older tickets, the BAA's utilization 
of a "Code 41" mechanism would have required the agency 
to make the same determinations of liability.  First, 
even if Code 41 was relevant to resolving the 
substantive issues this case presents, factual disputes 
over this mechanism's effect and existence at the time 
of Goodman's and O'Neill's hearings would preclude a 
grant of summary judgment.  Second, and more 
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 Second, I believe that the district court erred in 
concluding that Goodman and O'Neill were deprived of their 
property without due process of law.  The City committed such a 
violation, it reasoned, by failing to notify the plaintiffs that 
if they failed to appear before the Traffic Court prior to a 
certain date, their only recourse would be to the BAA.   
 The BAA is an administrative agency that does not even 
have the power to enter a civil judgment.  The Traffic Court, in 
contrast, rendered decisions determining criminal guilt. 
Accordingly, and appropriately, the BAA does not provide ticket 
recipients with all of the procedural protections and defenses 
that they could have relied upon in the Traffic Court.  However, 
nobody has suggested that the process the BAA does provide in 
adjudicating ticket challenges fails to meet constitutional 
standards.  Goodman and O'Neill only argue, and the district 
court only held, that before the City switched the forum in which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
importantly, Code 41 is not important here because the 
BAA did not employ it.  Goodman and O'Neill are 
attempting to establish municipal liability based on a 
policy that the City never followed in its dealings 
with them.  Their belief that the BAA would have made 
Code 41 determinations, and that when that occurred, 
they would have suffered the same alleged deprivation 
of due process, does not give them a viable claim 
against the City.  The official conduct that resulted 
in the constitutional harm the plaintiffs allegedly 
suffered was the hearing examiners' erroneous decisions 
to rule on their older tickets -- not the Code 41 
mechanism.  Under justiciability principles and the 
standard for municipal liability in § 1983 cases, 
Goodman and O'Neill cannot pursue a claim based on a 
rule or policy that never affected them. 
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ticket recipients would have to proceed, it was required to 
provide notice. 
 I would not accept that argument (and, I gather, 
neither would the majority).  The City has replaced one 
constitutionally adequate process with another.  True, someone 
who surely would have escaped criminal liability in Traffic Court 
might not prevail at the BAA.  But everyone who participates in 
BAA proceedings receives at least the process that is due before 
the City takes their property.  The City did not warn Goodman and 
O'Neill that they might lose their access to the Traffic Court; 
it did, however, provide them with notice of the parking charges 
against them and a meaningful opportunity to respond to those 
charges before reaching a decision that they would have to pay 
their fines.  Given these facts, the plaintiffs have at most 
suffered a deprivation of process without due process -- not a 
deprivation of property without due process.  That does not 
constitute a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The 
Constitution does not require notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before all rule changes that might effect an outcome.  So 
long as the new rules are adequate under due process standards --
and, again, no one has suggested that in this case, they are not 
-- the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied.  See Sill v. 
Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(rejecting argument that the University violated students' due 
process rights by subjecting them to disciplinary proceedings 
before a specially constituted panel that employed its own 
procedural rules); Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1928) ("No 
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one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure; and so 
long as a substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided 
due process of law is not denied by a legislative 
change."(citations omitted)); see also Maj. Op. at 6-7 n.4.0 
 Thus, in my view, while Goodman and O'Neill may have 
derived certain advantages from not paying their parking tickets, 
see Marion Wink, Women Who Love Men Who Don't Pay Their Parking 
Tickets, Cosmopolitan, April 1993, at 136, a viable § 1983 suit 
is not among them.  I would therefore reverse the district 
court's decision and remand the case so that judgment could be 
entered in favor of Philadelphia. 
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 The City makes the additional argument that under Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), the availability of post-
deprivation opportunities to challenge the hearing 
examiners' erroneous decisions provided the plaintiffs 
with constitutionally adequate process.  Because the 
BAA did provide the plaintiffs with all the process 
that was due prior to rendering its decisions, however, 
Parratt and other cases addressing the sufficiency of 
post-deprivation remedies are irrelevant. 
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IV. 
 Justice Frankfurter believed that "petty cases," even 
more than hard cases, are "calculated to make bad law."  United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting).  "The impact of a sordid little case," he explained, 
"is apt to obscure the implications of the generalization to 
which the case gives rise."  Id.  This easily qualifies as a 
petty case.  It is a dispute about a few parking tickets.  
Collectively, the plaintiffs' financial stake in the outcome is 
$218.00.  The generalization to which today's decision gives 
rise, however, is an important and, in my view, misguided one. 
 The majority does not and cannot limit its holding to 
meritless claims over small stakes.  Highly significant 
constitutional questions do arise in the context of 
administrative proceedings addressing seemingly minor issues of 
purely local concern.  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), 
is one example that comes to mind.  The plaintiffs in Yick Wo 
challenged a facially innocuous municipal ordinance that 
empowered a committee of city officials to determine who could 
and could not operate laundry businesses.  The case elicited one 
of the Supreme Court's earliest and most significant expositions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no state shall deny 
to any person the equal protection of the laws.  Needless to say, 
the scope and importance of issues addressed in administrative 
proceedings -- and consequently, the significance of the legal 
questions that arise from agency decision-making -- has steadily 
and dramatically increased during the years since Yick Wo. 
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 Even in cases such as the one before us, where the 
underlying constitutional claims are not so gripping, the rule 
the majority announces today does not reflect an appropriate 
balance between concerns of comity and federalism, on the one 
hand, and the values served by the federal courts meeting their 
responsibility to decide cases over which they have jurisdiction, 
on the other -- especially when that jurisdiction has been 
conferred by legislation intended to provide plaintiffs alleging 
that they have been deprived of federal rights under color of 
state law with direct access to a federal forum.  Thus, in my 
view, the majority's treatment of this petty case misapprehends 
even the general principles of "Our Federalism" it purports to 
defend. 
 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
